Today, a link to a text on a site I only discovered a few days ago that looks quite useful, the Online Library of Liberty. It's to the last chapter of a work of moral philosophy from 1747 by Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy or in its Latin original Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria. Hutcheson was one of the greatest influence on the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment and, arguably, upon the thought that underpinned the American founding fathers and Jefferson’s drafting of the Declaration of Independence.
It’s interesting because the last chapter of this work is on international law, diplomacy and treaty making - as its Latin title puts it aptly for this blog De Foederibus, Legatis, et Civitatum Interitu. One of the key elements of Hutcheson’s thought is that humans are implanted with a sense of moral virtue, which lead us to feel satisfied with actions and behaviours that are morally good, whilst being naturally dissatisfied with those that are not. By extension, his theory of morals, called the “benevolent theory” by some, which sees all human action as finding its origin in a natural sense of good will towards others, rather than in the perspective of earlier thinkers on international relations and law, particularly Samuel Pufendorf, whose work Hutcheson attacked directly, and Hobbes, who Pufendorf drew significantly upon, which suggest that the central drive of human behaviour is our self-interest and thus, by extension, states exist to protect us from ourselves. Hutcheson said specifically that he disagreed with Pufendorf’s view that “men were driven in society only for the sake of external advantage, and for fear of external evils, but in opposition to their natural turn of mind and to all natural affections and appetites.”
I should point out that I claim no expertise in Hutcheson, the precise details of the philosophical or legal debate he was involved in, nor in the intricacies of international thought of the mid-eighteenth century. What I find interesting, though, is that he was another early or pre-modern thinker – like Erasmus – who extended an idea of the goodness of individuals and extends this into a framework of inter-state politics, and in doing so, should be seen as part of the long and long-understudied tradition of international thought that is not driven by what have come to be called realist concerns.
It’s interesting because the last chapter of this work is on international law, diplomacy and treaty making - as its Latin title puts it aptly for this blog De Foederibus, Legatis, et Civitatum Interitu. One of the key elements of Hutcheson’s thought is that humans are implanted with a sense of moral virtue, which lead us to feel satisfied with actions and behaviours that are morally good, whilst being naturally dissatisfied with those that are not. By extension, his theory of morals, called the “benevolent theory” by some, which sees all human action as finding its origin in a natural sense of good will towards others, rather than in the perspective of earlier thinkers on international relations and law, particularly Samuel Pufendorf, whose work Hutcheson attacked directly, and Hobbes, who Pufendorf drew significantly upon, which suggest that the central drive of human behaviour is our self-interest and thus, by extension, states exist to protect us from ourselves. Hutcheson said specifically that he disagreed with Pufendorf’s view that “men were driven in society only for the sake of external advantage, and for fear of external evils, but in opposition to their natural turn of mind and to all natural affections and appetites.”
I should point out that I claim no expertise in Hutcheson, the precise details of the philosophical or legal debate he was involved in, nor in the intricacies of international thought of the mid-eighteenth century. What I find interesting, though, is that he was another early or pre-modern thinker – like Erasmus – who extended an idea of the goodness of individuals and extends this into a framework of inter-state politics, and in doing so, should be seen as part of the long and long-understudied tradition of international thought that is not driven by what have come to be called realist concerns.
No comments:
Post a Comment